Geopolitical drift and India’s eastern challenge

Recent developments on the diplomatic front—particularly the United States’ pro-Pakistan and anti-India stance following the first round of Operation Sindoor—have made it imperative for India to realign its strategy on both the diplomatic and security fronts. In matters of foreign policy, our national interest and security concerns must remain paramount.

The recent diplomatic tilt towards Russia and China represents a calculated and significant shift. If managed well, it could usher in a new era in India’s foreign policy, providing the strategic flexibility needed to reorient both internal and external security strategies to meet today’s geopolitical realities. Should an India–Russia–China axis take shape, it would undoubtedly unsettle policymakers in Washington and NATO capitals.

A New Strategic Landscape

Such manoeuvres, however, will take time to mature and yield tangible results. In the meantime, the security establishment—along with its key personnel—must prepare for fresh challenges from unexpected quarters. Particularly concerning is the growing rapport between Pakistan’s Army Chief and U.S. President Donald Trump, along with Islamabad’s deepening ties with Bangladesh, Turkey, and other Islamist-leaning countries.

In January this year, Lt. Gen. Karm-ul-Hassan, a senior Bangladeshi army officer, met with Pakistan’s Army Chief to discuss regional security dynamics. Both leaders underlined the importance of a strong defence partnership. That same month, Pakistan’s ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, led a delegation to Dhaka to establish an intelligence-sharing network between the two nations—a first such visit by an ISI chief to Bangladesh in decades. The delegation also visited Rangpur, close to India’s sensitive “chicken neck” corridor and the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

These visits and growing military cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh could have serious implications for peace in India’s Northeast—particularly in Assam, which faces imminent elections, as well as in Meghalaya and Manipur.

Narco-Terrorism and the Northeast

The Northeast has long been plagued by drug trafficking, with heroin and methamphetamine flowing in from Myanmar through porous borders. This illicit trade has fuelled insurgency and unrest, with drug lords on both sides of the border using narco-proceeds to fund their own interests, including supplying logistics, arms, and ammunition to separatist groups.

The ISI’s historic use of narco-money to foment unrest in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab is well-documented. It is highly probable that the agency will exploit drug networks in Myanmar, in collusion with local actors in the Northeast, to strengthen insurgent and separatist elements.

Years of determined effort—supported actively by the Ministry of Home Affairs—have brought relative peace to the region, culminating in peace accords with several separatist factions in Assam. But this fragile stability remains vulnerable. Pakistan’s strategic objective will be to disrupt this peace and open a “second front” in the East.

Bangladesh’s Strategic Drift

Bangladesh’s participation in the “Aman” joint naval exercise in February this year—its first such exercise with Pakistan in 20 years—is a clear signal of Dhaka’s shifting orientation. During the Aman Dialogue 2025, Bangladeshi Naval Chief Admiral Mohammad Hasan remarked, “Land divides but sea unites.” In the context of earlier Pakistani military statements describing the two nations as “brothers” who must remain “resilient against external influences,” this remark signals a warming of defence ties.

Pakistan has also pledged to train the Bangladesh Army, while Dhaka has expressed interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets—jointly developed by China and Pakistan. This move hints at the formation of a potential China–Pakistan–Bangladesh defence partnership.

That this realignment is occurring under an interim Bangladeshi government reportedly backed by the United States adds another layer of complexity. Such a partnership would not only strengthen Pakistan’s presence along India’s eastern borders but also enhance its strategic reach into the Bay of Bengal.

Security Implications for the East and Northeast

Given these developments, the Indian security establishment must focus more attention on the East and Northeast, especially in light of the continuing instability in Manipur and the upcoming elections in Assam and Bihar.

The ISI, working in concert with Bangladeshi intelligence, is unlikely to miss any opportunity to embarrass the Indian government by fomenting unrest in the region. This could extend to orchestrating high-profile terrorist attacks, as was the case in Pulwama and Pahalgam.

It is worth recalling that long before Pahalgam, Pakistani operatives had been cultivating ties with the Bangladeshi establishment. Statements by Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Asif Munir about “hitting India from the East” and by former Bangladeshi Army officer Maj. Gen. (Retd) AM Fazlur Rahman—who suggested that Bangladesh should “occupy the seven states of Northeastern India” in the event of an India–Pakistan war—underscore the potential for coordinated hostile intent. Rahman even recommended exploring a joint military arrangement with China to achieve this goal.

A Coordinated Strategy Against India?

These statements, spread over time yet sharing a common strategic thread, suggest more than just rhetorical posturing. They point to the possibility of a long-term, coordinated plan aimed at challenging India on its eastern flank. The meetings, naval exercises, intelligence-sharing agreements, and defence acquisitions collectively indicate a growing alignment between Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China—an alignment that cannot be ignored.

The danger is twofold: immediate destabilisation of the Northeast through insurgency, narco-terrorism, and political unrest; and the long-term strategic encirclement of India through hostile alliances along its eastern borders and maritime frontiers.

The Way Forward

India’s response must be multi-pronged and pre-emptive. Diplomatically, it must continue deepening engagement with regional partners—particularly those in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean—to offset the influence of adversarial coalitions. Intelligence-sharing with friendly nations should be expanded, and covert capabilities strengthened to monitor and disrupt hostile activities before they take root.

On the security front, the Northeast requires sustained investment in counter-insurgency infrastructure, enhanced border management, and local economic development to reduce the appeal of insurgent movements. Strengthening coastal and maritime surveillance in the Bay of Bengal is equally critical.

Finally, the government must treat these developments not as isolated incidents but as components of a broader strategic design. This requires close coordination between MEA, MHA, and the armed forces, along with the political will to act decisively.

India has faced such challenges before and prevailed, but the present situation demands heightened vigilance and strategic foresight. The combination of shifting alliances, revived insurgencies, and transnational crime in the East could, if ignored, pose as grave a threat to national security as any on our western borders.

We must, therefore, prepare—not just to respond, but to deter. In the face of a potentially hostile coalition forming in our neighbourhood, pre-emption, resilience, and strategic clarity will be our most effective weapons.