Autonomy in an age of coercion

India’s response to the United States’ military action in Venezuela was brief, careful and deliberate. New Delhi expressed “deep concern”, called for a peaceful resolution through dialogue, avoided explicit condemnation of the United States and steered clear of ideological language. That restraint was telling. It reflected not indifference to events in Caracas, but a conscious attempt to balance long-held principles with the realities of a strategic relationship that has acquired growing weight for India.

The developments in Venezuela matter for India not because New Delhi exercises influence in Latin America, but because they illuminate how power is increasingly being deployed and how fragile sovereignty can become when strategic interests collide. Seen against India’s diplomatic history, economic interests and doctrine of strategic autonomy, Venezuela is less a distant crisis than a signal of systemic change.

For much of the Cold War and the decades that followed, India functioned within an international framework that presumed limits to great-power behaviour. Military intervention was formally constrained, regime change publicly disavowed and international law, however unevenly applied, offered smaller and middle powers some insulation. This framework aligned with India’s worldview, shaped by decolonisation, sovereignty and non-interference.

Venezuela once occupied a broadly similar strategic space. It was not an Indian ally, but it was a participant in a Global South tradition that sought autonomy without confrontation. That tradition was institutionalised through the Non-Aligned Movement. When Venezuela chaired the movement in 2016, NAM’s influence had already diminished, but it still symbolised an idea India valued, that strategic independence could coexist with engagement in a multipolar world.

The current crisis underscores how far that idea has weakened.

A sitting head of state has been removed from his country following a US military operation justified by Washington on criminal and security grounds. Senior US officials have since spoken of overseeing a political transition. Whatever one’s assessment of Nicolás Maduro’s legitimacy, the episode raises serious questions about sovereignty, precedent and restraint. The range of international reactions, including from major powers and regional actors, reflects the unease such actions generate.

India’s official response mirrors this discomfort, but also an awareness of limits. By calling for dialogue and regional stability rather than issuing denunciations, New Delhi reaffirmed principle without escalating rhetoric. The absence of explicit condemnation should not be read as approval, but as recognition that moral clarity alone does not translate into influence in an increasingly coercive global environment.

There is also a clear economic dimension. India’s engagement with Venezuela has long been shaped by energy. Investments by ONGC Videsh in Venezuelan oil fields, while modest in scale, reflect India’s broader dependence on overseas energy assets and its effort to diversify supply sources. These ties were built on the assumption that commercial engagement and diplomatic goodwill could coexist with political divergence.

That assumption is now under strain.

Sanctions had already constrained India’s ability to fully realise its energy interests in Venezuela. Prolonged instability and external intervention add further uncertainty. The broader lesson is straightforward. Economic partnerships do not shield countries from geopolitical disruption once political isolation deepens. For India, one of the world’s largest energy importers, this reinforces the need to treat energy security not merely as a market issue, but as a strategic one shaped by power politics.

The Venezuela episode also highlights the limits of older collective frameworks. The Non-Aligned Movement once offered political solidarity and diplomatic insulation. Today, it provides little protection against unilateral action. India recognises this reality. While it continues to value multilateralism, it no longer relies on NAM as a primary strategic instrument, instead favouring flexible groupings and issue-based coalitions. Venezuela’s experience shows that the vacuum left by NAM has not been filled by effective global safeguards.

Instead, the international order is becoming more transactional.

The US action in Venezuela sits alongside a wider pattern. Wars challenge borders. Sanctions and tariffs are used as instruments of coercion. Resources and supply chains are increasingly securitised. Power is exercised with fewer attempts at justification through universal norms. Outcomes matter more than process.

For India, this shift has direct implications. India is large enough to matter, but not powerful enough to impose outcomes unilaterally. Its doctrine of strategic autonomy depends on a multipolar environment in which no single power can dictate terms. As that environment hardens, autonomy becomes more difficult to sustain through posture alone.

India’s restraint, therefore, should be read as strategy rather than ambiguity. By avoiding ideological language, New Delhi preserves working relations with Washington while signalling unease about precedent. By emphasising stability and civilian well-being, it affirms normative commitments without assuming responsibility for others’ actions. By prioritising the safety of Indian nationals, it grounds diplomacy in obligation rather than rhetoric.

Domestic reactions illustrate the wider debate. The Left parties have framed the US action as imperial aggression driven by resource interests and have demanded explicit condemnation. This draws on a familiar anti-imperialist tradition that resonates with India’s post-colonial history. But contemporary foreign policy is shaped less by moral binaries than by the management of exposure and risk.

The central lesson for India is practical rather than ideological. Venezuela’s trajectory shows what happens when economic resilience, institutional legitimacy, diplomatic flexibility and strategic relevance erode simultaneously. Once these pillars weaken, sovereignty becomes vulnerable to external pressure.

India is far removed from Venezuela’s position. Its economy is larger, its institutions more robust and its diplomatic reach far wider. Yet the principle still applies. Strategic autonomy is not declared, it is sustained. It rests on economic strength, technological capability, military credibility and diversified partnerships.

In this sense, the MEA’s response is less about Venezuela than about India itself. It reflects an understanding that the language of restraint still matters, but no longer guarantees protection. It acknowledges that norms are under strain without abandoning them. It seeks to preserve options in a world where rigid alignment is costly and neutrality increasingly difficult.

Venezuela was once part of the strategic space India preferred, shaped by non-alignment, multilateralism and resistance to coercion. What has happened there is a reminder that this space is shrinking. 

India’s challenge is not to lament that shift, but to adapt to it without surrendering the principles that ultimately safeguard its interests. In a global order that increasingly rewards power over principle, India must ensure that its autonomy rests not on nostalgia, but on capability, resilience and strategic judgement.

The author comments on South Asian politics, governance and foreign policy.