India finds new place in US strategy

The release of the Trump administration’s new United States National Security Strategy has rekindled global debate about the direction of American power. Framed by the familiar language of America First, the strategy sets out a vision of the world that is more transactional, more sceptical of alliances and more openly competitive. Yet for India, the document is striking not only for what it says but for what it implies. The NSS marks one of the clearest acknowledgments yet that India is no longer a peripheral actor in American planning. It is a recognised centre of gravity in a region the United States now sees as decisive to its future.

For Indian readers, the most important question is not how the United States intends to compete with China or manage its alliances. It is whether this new American posture creates space for India to expand its own influence, protect its interests and shape the emerging Indo Pacific order on its own terms. The answer, if one reads the NSS alongside recent American signalling, is cautiously affirmative. But it also demands a sober assessment of where Indian and American strategies converge, and where they inevitably diverge.

The NSS begins with a critical reassessment of Washington’s long experiment with engagement toward China. It argues that integration into global markets did not liberalise Beijing, but instead empowered it. This view is now almost a consensus in Washington, cutting across party lines. For India, the shift is significant. It brings American strategic thinking closer to the reality India has faced for more than a decade, a China that combines economic heft with territorial expansion and military modernisation.

Yet India’s alignment with the American worldview remains conditional. New Delhi’s concerns about China are grounded in lived experience, from border tensions to maritime pressure in the Indian Ocean. The United States, by contrast, sees China primarily through the lens of global competition. The NSS calls for industrial revival, technological protection and supply chain resilience, but these are geared toward preserving American primacy. India shares some of these goals but not all of their motivations. It seeks stability and equitable multi-polarity rather than a revival of unipolar dominance.

Where the NSS most directly touches Indian interests is in its treatment of the Indo Pacific. The strategy identifies the region as the world’s most consequential arena and elevates India as a critical partner in shaping its future. This is not mere diplomatic courtesy. For Washington, India now represents demographic scale, technological potential and geographic leverage in a way no other regional actor does. But for India, partnership with the United States is neither a favour nor a concession. It is a strategic choice anchored in the need to maintain room for independent action in a region crowded with major powers.

What distinguishes this NSS from earlier American documents is its acknowledgement of India’s strategic autonomy. It does not push for formal alliances, nor does it expect India to align with every United States priority. Instead, it envisions a looser but more durable form of cooperation. The Quad is part of this, but only a part. Maritime domain awareness, defence industrial collaboration, technology partnerships and supply chain diversification form the practical foundation of this relationship.

Still, India will need to navigate the widening gap between American expectations and Indian constraints. Washington’s approach to Taiwan, for instance, rests on maintaining overwhelming military deterrence. India supports stability in the region but has little interest in being drawn into the most dangerous fault-line of United States China rivalry. Similarly, the American call for technological decoupling has only partial resonance in India, which requires access to both markets even as it seeks to reduce vulnerabilities.

Europe’s diminished status in the NSS also affects India, albeit indirectly. The United States expects Europe to assume more responsibility for its defence and to align more closely with American commercial goals. For India, this is a mixed development. A Europe absorbed in internal challenges may be less able to invest in the Indo Pacific, reducing the potential for a broader balancing coalition. Yet a Europe more focused on economic engagement could create opportunities for India to expand technological and industrial partnerships independent of American influence.

Russia, too, features in the NSS in a way that matters to India. The strategy frames Russia as a challenge to be managed rather than confronted. This pragmatic approach aligns with India’s own need to maintain a working relationship with Moscow, particularly on energy and defence. While the United States remains uneasy about India’s Russia ties, the NSS suggests a grudging acceptance that Washington cannot dictate the terms of India’s strategic partnerships.

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the NSS is its emphasis on hemispheric control and domestic resilience. It prioritises border security, industrial revival and technological protection over global moral leadership. For India, this reorientation has two implications. First, it signals a United States less willing to act as the guarantor of global stability. Second, it places greater responsibility on regional powers to manage their own security environments. India has long argued for such an arrangement, but it now faces the practical challenge of shaping an Indo Pacific in which American presence is purposeful but not omnipresent.

The broader question is what India wants from this moment. The NSS offers recognition, partnership and the prospect of a shared approach to regional security. But India’s ambitions cannot be defined by American documents. They must arise from India’s own assessments of power, risk and opportunity. India seeks a stable multipolar Asia, not a binary dominated by China and the United States. It wants resilient supply chains without sacrificing economic autonomy. It prefers collaborative maritime order without being trapped in rigid blocs.

The task for Indian strategy, therefore, is to convert American interest into Indian influence. This requires deeper investment in naval capacity, technological development and regional diplomacy. It also requires clarity about where Indian and American goals align and where they do not. The NSS is a starting point, not a blueprint, for India’s engagement with the United States.

If the trajectory of the coming decade is shaped by competition with China, selective engagement with Europe and flexible coalitions across Asia, India will be one of the few states with the agency to shape outcomes rather than simply adapt to them. The new NSS recognises this reality. The challenge now is for India to turn recognition into strategic advantage, on its own terms and in pursuit of its own vision for the Indo Pacific.