India seeks balance as SCO opens

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1, comes at a time of geopolitical turbulence. For India, the meeting arrives just weeks after Washington sharply raised tariffs on key Indian exports, citing New Delhi’s continued purchase of discounted Russian oil. Against this backdrop, the SCO stage offers both opportunity and test: to recalibrate partnerships, manage contradictions, and send the message that economic coercion will not dictate India’s choices.

From Talk Shop to Global Bloc
Once dismissed in Western capitals as little more than a security club, the SCO has evolved into a significant Eurasian grouping. With China and Russia at its core and India joining as a full member in 2017, the organisation today represents about 40 per cent of the world’s population and nearly a quarter of global GDP. Its agenda has broadened from counter-terrorism to connectivity, energy security, digital economy and cultural cooperation. India has engaged cautiously—projecting itself as a bridge, but without letting SCO alignments dilute its Western ties. The 2025 summit, however, is not business as usual. Moscow remains under Western sanctions. Beijing is pushing for greater use of the yuan in trade settlements. Central Asia seeks room for manoeuvre between its larger neighbours. Into this churn enters India, burdened by fresh US tariffs but still reliant on American markets and Russian energy.

India’s Stakes

For New Delhi, the SCO is a field of many overlapping interests:

• Connectivity: In the SCO’s push for regional linkages, the Belt and Road Initiative is a dominating factor for China. While India’s focus on the International North–South Transport Corridor and the Chabahar port project underline the need to keep alternatives open.
• Energy: Central Asia’s gas and uranium reserves are an attractive option, even as geography and geopolitics limit access to them. With tariffs squeezing trade options, diversifying partners in energy has become very urgent.
• Counter-terrorism: While SCO joint statements carry limited enforcement, they give India a platform to flag cross-border terrorism without Western filters.

• Strategic space: Above all, SCO engagement allows India to hedge—working with Russia, China, and Central Asia together, rather than being boxed in by Washington’s expectations.

The Tariff Signal

The US decision in August to double duties on a range of Indian exports—textiles, tyres, chemicals—sent shockwaves through industry. Tariffs on some items now stand at 50 per cent. The move was widely read as retaliation against India’s refusal to cut back Russian oil imports. For exporters, particularly in traditional sectors, the pain is immediate. For policymakers, the message is broader: strategic autonomy has costs.
The Tianjin summit therefore becomes more than a regional gathering. It is a platform for India to show it has options—whether through energy deals with Russia and Central Asia, rupee-settled trade experiments, or simply the optics of sitting as an equal alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Managing China
The sharpest test will be India’s handling of China. Relations remain tense after border clashes in Ladakh. Trust is scarce. Yet China is both host and heavyweight of the SCO.India’s approach will likely be two-track: resist Beijing’s attempts to push Belt and Road projects through the SCO, while working with Russia and Central Asia to ensure the forum does not become a Chinese echo chamber.
India will also avoid appearing obstructionist. Prime Ministerial presence in Tianjin itself will be read as a signal that New Delhi is neither isolated by tariffs nor willing to be confined to binary camps.

Russia as Buffer

Moscow, hemmed in by sanctions, leans heavily on Beijing but remains India’s most consistent defence supplier and energy partner. Within the SCO, Russia has often balanced Chinese dominance. Reaffirming this relationship will be important. The recent restart of direct Delhi–Moscow flights and discussions on joint energy projects underline continuity.

Central Asia’s Role

Often overlooked, the Central Asian republics are the SCO’s real centre. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan view India as a useful counterweight to Chinese overreach. They seek Indian investment in IT, pharmaceuticals and training. For India, their support ensures the SCO does not harden into a purely Sino-Russian platform. Expect New Delhi to extend scholarships, cultural programmes, and digital initiatives aimed at these states—small but significant steps in building goodwill.

The Narrative at Stake

Beyond policy specifics, the SCO is about narrative. India’s presence in Tianjin conveys:
• It is not isolated by American tariffs.
• Western pressure has no impact on its strong ties with Russia.
• It can engage China pragmatically without compromising sovereignty.
• It continues to back multipolarity over bloc politics.
This matters domestically as well. With several state elections looming, the government cannot appear weak under foreign pressure. Projecting independence and constructive engagement strengthens its hand at home.

Risks to Watch
The risks are real. A declaration tilted too far toward Chinese priorities could leave India sidelined. A public spat with Pakistan—another SCO member—could distract from the agenda.

And Washington could view India’s SCO activism as drift towards Moscow and Beijing, prompting further economic retaliation. Yet India has managed contradictions before. During the Cold War, it juggled ties with Moscow and Washington while building solidarity with the non-aligned. The SCO is a similar stage, though sharper in context.

Looking Forward

The SCO will not replace India’s partnerships with the US or Europe. But it can soften the tariff blow, expand options in energy and connectivity, and underscore that India will not be coerced. The Tianjin summit is less about communiqués than about presence—India showing up, engaging, and signalling resilience. As the summit opens, the wider question is whether multipolarity can be managed rather than contested. Answers for India, lie in pragmatism. India will buy affordable Russian oil. It will partner the US in technology when their interests align. And it will at the same time sit with China in the SCO when the stage demands. It is a delicate balancing act. But the message that emerges from Tianjin is that tariffs may well bruise, but they will notdictate. Strategic autonomy that has been built over decades will not be surrendered in a single instance of trade pressure.