South Asia tests India’s diplomacy

India’s foreign policy towards South Asia is routinely framed in the reassuring language of proximity and partnership. The Neighbourhood First doctrine promises priority, sensitivity and shared prosperity, rooted in geography and shared histories. Yet across the region, crises recur with unsettling regularity. Political churn in Nepal, economic collapse in Sri Lanka, democratic backsliding and minority anxieties in Bangladesh, turbulence in Maldives, and prolonged conflict in Myanmar have each tested India’s regional posture. The problem is not the absence of engagement. It is the absence of trust, which turns every disruption into a diplomatic stress test.

What is striking is how familiar the pattern has become. Each crisis is treated as an exception, shaped by local peculiarities, domestic failures or external interference. Rarely is there any sustained reflection on whether India’s own approach has structural limitations. Over time, this reluctance to self-assess has produced a paradox. India is deeply involved in the neighbourhood, yet remains vulnerable to sudden political shifts, public backlash and accusations of overreach. Influence appears contingent rather than durable. At the core of this paradox lies a policy framework that is strong on responsiveness but thin on social anchoring. India’s regional diplomacy remains overwhelmingly state-centric. Engagement is conducted primarily through governments, security establishments and project-based economic assistance. These tools are necessary, but insufficient. When political transitions occur or social tensions erupt, the absence of deep people-to-people trust becomes visible. Governments change, narratives shift, and India’s intentions are easily reframed as intrusive or self-serving.

This is not a new problem. India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s, through the Indian Peacekeeping Force, was driven by legitimate security concerns and regional stability calculations. Yet the lack of local legitimacy and political consensus turned a strategic intervention into a deeply unpopular episode, leaving scars in bilateral relations for decades. The lesson was clear. Proximity and power do not substitute for trust, especially in politically fragmented societies.

Nepal offers a more recent example. India has historically enjoyed deep cultural, economic and social ties with Nepal, reinforced by an open border and extensive people-to-people movement. Yet political transitions in Kathmandu have repeatedly produced friction. The 2015 constitutional crisis and the subsequent disruption of cross-border supplies, widely perceived in Nepal as an Indian blockade, left a lasting imprint on public opinion. Even years later, Indian engagement, however pragmatic, is filtered through memories of vulnerability and pressure. The episode underlined how quickly trust can erode when diplomacy is seen as coercive, regardless of intent.

Sri Lanka’s economic collapse in 2022 highlighted another dimension of this trust deficit. India’s rapid financial assistance, fuel supplies and credit lines played a critical role in stabilising the situation. New Delhi’s response was widely acknowledged as timely and generous, especially in contrast to slower multilateral processes. Yet domestic debates in Sri Lanka periodically questioned India’s strategic motives, particularly as leadership transitions unfolded. Assistance helped manage the crisis, but it did not automatically translate into long-term political confidence. Trust built during emergencies proved fragile once normal politics resumed.

This fragility is compounded by the fact that India’s neighbours are not merely smaller states with limited agency. They are politically plural societies with their own internal debates, resentments and aspirations. Bangladesh illustrates this complexity. While bilateral cooperation on connectivity, trade and security has expanded significantly over the past decade, anxieties over minority rights, electoral competition and democratic space continue to shape domestic discourse. India’s cautious and sometimes uneven responses to these concerns, shaped by immediate strategic calculations, have fed perceptions of selective principles. Support for stability, when divorced from visible concern for inclusion, risks alienating sections of society whose goodwill matters over the long term.

The emphasis on infrastructure and financial assistance further illustrates this gap. Lines of credit, connectivity corridors, ports and energy cooperation are routinely showcased as symbols of goodwill. In Maldives, India’s infrastructure projects and security cooperation have been central to its engagement. Yet political narratives portraying India as overbearing have periodically gained traction, particularly during election cycles. Projects alone do not create political legitimacy. Without transparency, local consultation and sustained cultural engagement, even well-intentioned initiatives can be portrayed as instruments of influence. When projects face delays or local opposition, trust erodes further.

Another persistent weakness lies in strategic ambiguity. At the global level, India’s calibrated ambiguity allows room for manoeuvre. In the neighbourhood, however, ambiguity often breeds uncertainty. India’s responses to democratic backsliding, political repression or constitutional upheaval vary across countries. In Myanmar, India has balanced security concerns and border stability against its stated support for democratic processes. While pragmatic, this balancing act has limited India’s credibility among pro-democracy constituencies in the region. Neighbours struggle to understand where India stands on principles it publicly espouses, such as pluralism and political inclusion.

Security considerations further narrow India’s diplomatic bandwidth. Concerns over terrorism, insurgency, border stability and the influence of external powers are legitimate. Yet when security becomes the dominant lens, diplomacy turns reactive and defensive. Engagement is framed in terms of risk containment rather than partnership building. The long-running conflict in Myanmar’s border regions demonstrates this tension. A security-first approach may deliver short-term stability, but it rarely fosters long-term goodwill among affected populations, whose perceptions shape future political trajectories.

The costs of this trust deficit are increasingly visible. External actors offering alternative economic or diplomatic support find receptive audiences in societies that feel uncertain about India’s intentions. Anti-India sentiment, whether organic or politically mobilised, gains traction during moments of crisis. Even when India acts with restraint, its actions are interpreted through a lens of suspicion shaped by years of uneven engagement. Influence becomes episodic, activated during emergencies but diluted during normal times.

A more resilient neighbourhood policy requires a shift in emphasis. Trust cannot be treated as an automatic outcome of geography or historical ties. It must be consciously cultivated. This means investing in institutions that outlast governments. Parliamentary exchanges, academic collaboration, media engagement and civil society dialogue remain underdeveloped tools in India’s regional diplomacy. Educational scholarships, cultural programmes and professional networks can shape elite and public perceptions over decades, not election cycles. Subnational actors also matter. Indian states that share borders, languages and economic ties with neighbouring countries possess deep contextual knowledge and organic connections. Yet they are rarely integrated into foreign policy planning in a systematic way. Empowering border states to participate in cross-border cooperation, trade facilitation and cultural exchange could anchor diplomacy in lived realities rather than abstract strategy.

Clarity of principles is equally important. India need not adopt a moralistic posture, but it must articulate consistent red lines. Selective silence or uneven responses undermine long-term influence more than principled disagreement. Neighbours respect predictability, even when they contest outcomes. A foreign policy that is intelligible is more trusted than one that is tactically agile but normatively opaque.

Finally, India must recognise that leadership in South Asia cannot be exercised through crisis management alone. It requires patience, humility and an acceptance of plural regional voices. Neighbourhood First must evolve from a slogan into a framework that treats trust as a strategic asset rather than a by-product.

Without this shift, India will continue to find itself reacting to crises rather than shaping the regional environment. Proximity will ensure involvement. Without trust, it will not ensure influence.